Lookalike fee addresses focused practically 4.5 million Solana wallets over 11 months, in keeping with blockchain-data agency Bitquery’s Oct. 9, 2026 findings. The findings present why a profitable small take a look at switch can nonetheless precede a a lot bigger fee to a scammer.
The method, often known as tackle poisoning, vegetation a deceptive entry in a pockets’s fee historical past. A tiny incoming switch places the sender’s lookalike tackle close to a authentic fee. If the consumer later copies that tackle, they’ll ship cash to the mistaken recipient.
A Solana take a look at switch can attain the mistaken tackle
Bitquery describes a Nov. 17, 2025 case during which a pockets first paid $10 in USDT to its Gate.io deposit tackle. A lookalike despatched mud 12 seconds later. The pockets then despatched a second $10 take a look at to the faux, adopted by 30,749.80 USDT to that very same tackle.
The implication is {that a} profitable take a look at confirms supply to the chosen tackle, however can’t set up who controls it. If the vacation spot was copied incorrectly, repeating the fee repeats the error.
Receiving mud doesn’t itself drain a pockets on this mechanism. The loss happens when its proprietor subsequently authorizes a fee to the lookalike.
Bitquery counted 4,497,798 focused wallets from Oct. 30, 2025, by Oct. 7, 2026. Its rule required a same-day fee of at the least $1 in SOL, USDC or USDT, adopted by mud or a faux stablecoin token from a unique tackle matching at the least three characters at every finish of the payee.
The loss evaluation used a smaller subset: roughly 3.0 million wallets poisoned by July 9, 2026. Of these, 1,104 made qualifying funds totaling $940,106. The broader focusing on depend doesn’t imply 4.5 million wallets misplaced cash.
The loss whole is a ground. It counts funds of at the least $1 inside 90 days of the primary mud. Past that window, a fee might qualify if extra mud arrived that day. Wallets poisoned after July 9 and funds exterior these guidelines have been excluded. Bitquery additionally eliminated possible current relationships, akin to pairs with earlier funds or repayments; some real thefts could have been excluded.
Phantom’s address-poisoning steerage advises avoiding addresses copied from transaction historical past and verifying the tackle earlier than sending.
Its receiving-payment directions separate the checks: first affirm the precise recipient tackle and community, then lookup the transaction standing on an explorer. Phantom additionally says it can’t recuperate tokens despatched to the mistaken tackle.
