Rene Pickhardt not too long ago kicked off a thread discussing the variations between two celebration and multiparty (greater than two individuals) fee channels because it pertains to his analysis work round fee reliability on the Lightning Community. He voices a rising skepticism of the viability of that route for improvement.
The excessive stage concept of why channel factories enhance the reliability of funds comes all the way down to liquidity allocation. In a community of solely two celebration channels, customers must make zero sum selections on the place to allocate their liquidity. This has a systemic impact on the general success fee of funds throughout the community, if folks put their liquidity someplace it isn’t wanted to course of funds as an alternative of the place it’s, funds will fail because the liquidity in locations folks want is used up (till it’s rebalanced). This dynamic is just one of many design constraints of the Lightning Community identified from the very starting, and why analysis like Rene’s is extremely vital for making the protocol/community work in the long term.
In a mannequin of multiparty channels, customers can allocate liquidity into massive teams and easily “sub-allocate” it off-chain wherever it is smart to within the second. Because of this even when a node operator has made a poor determination by which particular person to allocate liquidity to, so long as that particular person is in the identical multiparty channel with folks that will be an excellent peer, they will reallocate that poorly positioned liquidity from one to the opposite off-chain with out incurring on-chain prices.
This works as a result of the idea of a multiparty channel is basically simply everybody within the group stacking standard two celebration channels on high of the multiparty one. By updating the multiparty channel on the root, the 2 celebration channels on high may be modified, opened, closed, and many others. whereas staying off-chain. The issue Rene is elevating is the price of going on-chain when folks don’t cooperate.
The complete logic of Lightning is predicated round the concept that in case your single channel counterparty stops cooperating or responding, you may merely submit transactions on chain to implement management over your funds. When you’ve got a multiparty channel, every “stage” within the stack of channels provides extra transactions that must be submitted to the blockchain to be able to implement the present state, that means that in a excessive charge atmosphere multiparty channels will probably be costlier than two celebration channels to implement on-chain.
These are core trade-offs to contemplate when these methods in contrast to one another, however I feel focusing completely on the on-chain footprint ignores the extra vital level concerning off-chain methods: they’re all about incentivizing individuals to not go on-chain.
Correctly structuring a multiparty channel, i.e. the way you manage the channels stacked on high, can help you pack teams of individuals into subsections which have a popularity for top reliability, or who belief one another. This could permit folks in these subgroups to nonetheless reorganize liquidity inside that subgroup even when folks outdoors of it will not be responsive quickly, or go offline attributable to technical points. The on-chain value of implementing issues, whereas vital, is form of tangential to the core design objective of an off-chain system: giving folks a purpose to remain off-chain and cooperate, and eradicating causes for folks to not cooperate and drive issues onc-chain.
It’s vital to not lose sight of that core design facet of those methods when contemplating what their future will appear to be.